Introduction
Employing investment decision-making rules under uncertainty, e.g., the Markovitz ( Let us now illustrate the same issue with SD rules.
Suppose that you have to choose between prospect X and prospect Y, where X yields 0 with a probability of 0.01 and a million dollars with a probability of 0.99, and Y yields one dollar with certainty. It would not be odd if in any sample of DM one takes, 100% of the subjects would choose X. Yet, SD rules (and the MV rule alike), which relate to "all" utility functions in a given class, reveal that neither X nor Y dominates the other. The reason for this SD result is that there is a utility function revealing a preference for Y even in this case. However, it seems to us that in practice all subjects would prefer X to Y (would you?), but SD and MV rules which relate to all subjects are unable to reveal this preference. The inability to reveal a preference in this case is induced by the fact that stochastic dominance rules (and the mean-variance rule) relate to "all" utility functions in a given class, including "extreme" utility functions which formally LESHNO AND LEVY Almost Stochastic Dominance are included in a given class of utility functions, but probably do not characterize the preference of any investor. For example, take the utility function such that for x < 1, u(x) = x, and for x > 1, u(x) = 1. This utility function belongs to the risk-averse class, and it is easy to show that investors with this preference would prefer Y over X. As we believe any sample of subjects we take would reveal 100% preference for X over Y, we claim that the above utility function is "extreme" and does not represent most, if any, investors, hence should be ruled out. It is irrelevant because it assumes that the marginal utility beyond x = 1 is zero; i.e., the investor is indifferent whether the higher outcome results of X are $1, $106, or for that matter a billion dollars. Whether an investor with such a utility exists or not, we will never know. If such an investor exists, he is not included in our group of investors, which we call "most" DM. The inability of the MV rule to distinguish between two options, when it seems that such a preference exists, is not new. Baumol (1963) , who realizes such possible scenarios, suggests another criterion called "Expected Gain-Confidence Limit Criterion" as a substitute to the MV decision rules. Baumol argued that an investment with relatively high standard deviation oa will be relatively safe if its expected value u is sufficiently high. He therefore proposes the following risk index: RI = /u -ka, where k is some constant selected by the investor representing his/her safety requirement such that the return is unlikely to fall below it.
In this paper we will establish the modified stochastic dominance rules to show how to obtain decisions which reveal a preference for X over Y in the above two examples. Our new rules relate to a subclass of the class of utilities to which the existing stochastic dominance rules relate. We develop Almost Stochastic Dominance rules (ASD). With these rules it is possible that the distributions of the return on two prospects under comparison do not obey any SD preference, but with "a small change" SD rules reveal a preference. Thus with ASD, X dominates Y (in the example above). A small change is made in the cumulative distribution such that it eliminates the possibility of a preference by extreme utility functions for what we believe is considered by most investors to be the inferior prospect. These rules are called ASD because they are appropriate for "most" investors in a given class of utility functions. Thus, these rules are appropriate for all utility functions after deleting "extreme" preferences like the utility function given above with u'(x) = 0 for x > 1. The advantages of ASD over SD and over the mean-variance rule are: (a) ASD are able to rank otherwise unrankable alternatives.
(b) ASD eliminate from the SD efficient set alternatives which seem to be inferior by "most" investors.
(c) ASD sheds light on the debate related to optimal portfolio composition and the planned investor horizon. It is possible to establish a functional relationship between the percentage of equity in the portfolio and the planned investor's horizon. Namely, ASD may be employed by financial advisors in choosing portfolios for "young" versus "old" investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background and motivation for the paper. Section 3 contains the main results, followed by ?4 with the concluding remarks.
Motivation and Background
We first define SD rules and demonstrate intuitively the concept of ASD with two examples. We show that in these two examples there is no stochastic dominance relationship. Yet, it seems that "most" DM prefer one prospect over the other. We say "it seems," as we leave it to the reader to judge our assertion. In the examples below, we relate to First-Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD) and Second-Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD). Therefore, let us first define these decision rules. Let X and Y be two random variables, and F and G denote the cumulative distribution functions of X and Y, respectively. Levy (1992 Levy ( , 1998 on the relation between one-period and multiperiod rates of return on two investments. One of the critical issues in finance is the ongoing debate between practitioners and academics regarding the optimal mix of bonds and stocks as a function of the planned investment horizon. Practitioners claim that for long-run investors, equity dominates bonds (or that the proportion of equity in the portfolio should be increased) because the risk of stocks tends to cancel out over many investment periods (cross-time diversification, see, for example, Bernstein 1986). However, there is a contrasting view, argued mainly by academics, which asserts that no matter how long the investment horizon, equity will not dominate bonds (Samuelson 1994). Relying on strict mathematical arguments, Samuelson is correct in this debate. We demonstrate this with the following example and then suggest the ASD rule to solve this debate, showing that while academics are correct-that equity will never dominate bonds for "all" investors (no matter how long the horizon)-practitioners are correct that such dominance exists for "most" investors. Moreover, as the investment horizon increases, the group of "most" investors revealing the preference for equity as practitioners claim, increases.
FSD. F dominates G by FSD (F > G) if F(t) < G(t) for all t E R and
We compare below two portfolios X and Y where X has a higher proportion of stocks than Y, and the rest is invested in a less risky asset called bonds. However, for simplicity of the presentation below we refer to stocks by X and to bonds by Y, recalling that both X and Y are portfolios of bonds and stocks, but X has a higher component of stocks. Thus, we consider two assets X (stocks) and Y (bonds), with cumulative distribution functions of F and G, respectively. The one-period return of X and Y is given by X) = 1 + X and y() = 1 + Y, respectively, when X and Y stand for rates of return. Take the following example:
The return after n periods is X() = Hn (l + Xi) and y(n) = n l (1+ Yi), respectively. Assume that the returns are independent and identical over time. For any n, the cumulative distribution of Xn) starts to the left of the cumulative distribution of y(n), hence Xn) never dominates y(n) by FSD. Indeed, there are some utility functions revealing a preference for y(n) regardless of n, hence Xn will not dominate y(n) by FSD no matter how large n is. However, although Xn does not dominate y(n) by FSD, it can be easily shown that in the above specific example, as n increases the cumulative distribution of the stocks is shifted to the right much faster than the cumulative distribution of the bonds, hence the attractiveness of X relative to Y increases with an increase in n, which conforms with the practitioners claim. Consider Figures l(a) and (b), which demonstrate the cumulative distributions for n = 1 and n = 50. Note that for n = 50, the FSD of F over G. However, it is worth mentioning that despite the fact that Pr(X() > y(n)) -1 as n -> oo, for a preference with a constant relative risk aversion (e.g., u(x) = x/ca, a < 1), if X is preferred to Y in the above example for n = 1, such a preference exists for all n > 1 (see Samuelson 1994) . We believe that this utility function is "extreme." In our specific example, if Y is preferred for n = 1 it assigns a very low marginal utility for relatively high outcomes, hence the superiority of X over Y for large n is not revealed, despite the fact that the cumulative distribution of X is located almost entirely to the right of the cumulative distribution of Y. Whether a utility function revealing a preference of y(n) over X() (a constant relative risk aversion), when Pr(X(n) > Y(")) -> 1 as n -oo, should be considered a reasonable or an "extreme" function is rather subjective.2 In this paper we suggest a decision criterion such that for most nondecreasing utility functions u one can show that there exists an integer n such that Ex(n)(u) > Ey(n)(u) for "most" investors, i.e., "almost" FSD (AFSD) exists for the long-run investors (n periods, where n is large enough). Thus, we will show that for long investment horizons, "most" investors with a nondecreasing utility function would prefer to invest in X (more in equity) rather than in Y (more in bonds), as practitioners claim.3 We shall show that the ("one play") and multiperiod ("multiple plays") choices. They find that when the subjects observe the multiple play distributions they tend to accept the multiple (risky) play than they do the one-play case. Hence, for multiple play there is more preference to play than in the one play, i.e., in the specific case of our study to invest in stocks rather than bonds where the multiple play and one play stand for the multiperiod and one-period choices in our case. larger n is, the larger the group of "most" investors and it becomes closer to the group of "all" investors, which explains the practitioners' assertion that, in the long run, stocks dominate bonds.4 Yet, for some "extreme" utility functions no matter how large n is, no dominance is revealed because this extreme utility function assigns an extremely high utility value to an area which is close to zero, or an extremely low utility value to high outcomes. Therefore, our AFSD relates to a class of nondecreasing utility functions, excluding the extreme ones. This will be shown later in the paper. Thus, AFSD is useful as it can be used for portfolio recommendation where the larger the planned investment horizon, the larger the equity component in the portfolio. It seems to us, facing the above two prospects, that most investors would prefer X over Y. We do not claim that an extreme utility showing a preference for 4Levy (1996) showed that when riskless borrowing and lending are allowed, and the investors choose their portfolios by the meanvariance rule with no portfolio revisions, the opposite holds; i.e. as n increases, specialization in the asset with the lowest mean is obtained. However, here we do not allow the riskless asset, but simply compare between X and Y. Moreover, we do not rely here on the mean-variance rule but employ the maximum expected utility criterion. Each approach has its pros and cons. The Meyer approach seems to be more intuitive because he eliminates utility functions with an extreme risk aversion. However, in his approach there is no clue of what the upper and lower bounds should be on r(x) to have "reasonable" decisions. Moreover, he does not allow a utility function with a linear segment (or close to linear) because in this case -(u"(x)/u'(x))= 0 will be below the lower bound. In contrast, in our approach when there is a violation of FSD, we require that u'(x) will not be given an extreme weight to the area of violation, and similarly, when there is a violation of SSD, we make sure that u"(x) will not be given extremely high weight to the area of violation. Moreover, the restrictions on u'(x) or u"(x) are a function of the violation area, relative to the total area enclosed between F and G. In brief, if the SD violation area is small relative to the total area enclosed between F and G, we make sure that this small violation area will not get an extremely high utility weight, hence we can rank the two prospects even though FSD or SSD can not rank the prospects under consideration. 
It is interesting to

SSD
The left sides of (5) and (6) describe the "amount of correction" needed (for the definition of S1 and S2 see Equations (3) and (4)). We shall show that AFSD implies that EF(X) > EG(Y), but in ASSD (6) does not imply EF(X) > EG(Y), and (7) is an explicit required condition for ASSD.6
Note that ASD requires that the nagging negative area where G is above F has to be a small fraction (s) of the total absolute area difference between F and g.
An alternative characterization of ASD that requires a distribution to be "close to" another distribution that dominates in the traditional sense of FSD or SSD is presented in the following proposition. Thus, ASD can be equivalently defined as follows (the proofs are inferior. For example, an investment recipe may be: For n < 5, invest 40% or less in bonds, for 5 < n < 10 invest 20% or less in bonds, etc. Such a recipe conforms with the common recommendation to increase the proportion of equity in the portfolio as the investment horizon increases.
Concluding Remarks
In some cases it seems that "most" decision makers (DM) would prefer one prospect over another, yet due to a very small violation of these rules, stochastic dominance (SD) rules (as well as the mean-variance rule) are unable to distinguish between the two prospects under consideration. One can increase the mean of one distribution as far as one wishes, yet a very small violation of SD criteria induces no dominance because there is some "extreme" utility function which assigns a very large weight to the violation area or a very small weight to very large outcomes, regardless of the big difference in the means of the two distributions. Thus, the "negative" area enclosed between the two cumulative distributions may be negligible relative to the "positive" area, yet SD is not revealed. Therefore, SD rules may lead to results, asserting no dominance in spite of the fact that it seems that "most" DM would claim that dominance exists. We suggest in this paper "almost stochastic dominance rules" (ASD) which are able to reveal that "most" investors would prefer one investment over the other, in spite of the fact that such preference is not revealed by the SD rules. Thus, the ASD rules can be considered as modified SD rules after eliminating the extreme utility functions, e.g., a function which assigns the same utility to, say, $1 and to $106. We do not claim that such extreme preference will never exist. But because we believe they are not typical, in constructing ASD rules we rule them out. Thus, ASD rules may reveal dominance in some cases where no-dominance relationship with SD rules prevails.
The ASD rules have several advantages over the SD (or MV) rules. First, ASD rules can rank alternatives which otherwise are unrankable. Second, ASD rules reveal preference which conforms with one's intuition, while SD may reveal a counterintuitive nodominance decision. Finally, ASD rules are useful in portfolio construction for investors with various planned investment horizons. To be more specific, ASD rules shed light on the debate among practitioners and academics regarding the dominance of stocks over bonds for long-run investors. Practitioners claim that as the investment horizon increases, a portfolio with a relatively large component of stocks will dominate a portfolio with a relatively large component of bonds, but SD rules do not conform with this assertion. Indeed, we show that though "the stocks portfolio" generally does not dominate "the bonds portfolio" by SD, for long-run investors such dominance exists by ASD. Hence, indeed "most" long horizon investors will prefer stocks over bonds. Moreover, as the investment horizon increases, the group of "most" investors becomes closer to the group of "all" investors. However, academics are correct that for myopic utility functions with all assets invested (i.e., no constant exists in the argument of the utility function), the decision whether to invest in stocks or in bonds (or in some mix of the two) is invariant to the assumed investment horizon. Thus, investors with a myopic utility function may remain in the group of "all" investors but not in the group of "most" investors no matter how long the investment horizon is. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that some of the utility functions belonging to U1 and not to UJ (or to U2 and not to U2) are indeed "extreme" where extreme is defined in the spirit of the above explanation. Thus, extreme utility functions can be the main explanation for the possible debate between practitioners and academics regarding the optimal portfolio mix as a function of the investment horizon. It is interesting to note that the myopic utility function is eliminated by Meyer (1997a), who imposes conditions on the risk-aversion measure. Having resolved the above issue, the ASD can be employed in practice by portfolio managers. For a given e one can employ ASD to find the proportion of equity to be included in the portfolio corresponding to a given planned investment horizon. A recommendation of, say, no less than 40% bonds if n < 5, no less than 20% bonds if 5 < n < 10, is possible, which may be very useful.
To sum up, the ASD conforms with the intuition asserting that in the long run stocks are more attractive than bonds, even though not for all investors. There are those stubborn myopic investors who completely ignore the investment horizon, and this is the reason why we have ASD, but not SD.
